India bombs Parippu Dhal to Sri Lanka with a view to Invade- year 1987
Following is a gleaning from the book titled ‘Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas” by the Indian journalist M. R. Narayan Swamy ISBN 81-220-0386-9
On June 3, that intervention took the form of a flotilla of 19 fishing boats loaded with 38 tonnes of pulses, bread, vegetables, milk, rice, salt, kerosene and match boxes which set sail for Jaffna from Rameshwaram, in Tamil nadu, flying Red Cross flags. On board were nearly 100 journalists. But the Sri Lankan navy barred the way, and the flotilla returned to Tamil Nadu after six-hour sea odyssey.
The next day, giving Colombo a bare 35-mintue notice, five Indian AN-32 transporters took off from Banglore and, with a protective ring thrown by
four Mirage fighters, air dropped 25 tonnes of relief material over Jaffna. It was Gandhi’s response to the Sri Lankan refusal to entertain the
flotillas. The Indian government made I clear that any shooting a he aircraft would be met by force. A livid Athulathmudali, his ‘Operation Liberation” now in limbo, said some of the Indian food was eaten by crows after they fell into the Jaffna lagoon.
The Indian intervention marked a new chapter in the ethnic conflict and culminated within two months in the historic India Sri Lanka accord. The air drop was also the most explicit warning Gandhi administered to Jayawardena about Indian intentions vis-Ã -vis Sri Lanka. The Tamil Times of London claimed that India was no more a mediator in Sri Lanka. ‘She (has) chosen her side in the Sri Lankan conflict,’ the journal said. ‘She has identifies herself with the Sri Lankan Tamils… Sri Lankan Tamils all over the world... can only entrust their fae in the hands of mother India.”
Although the June 4 air drop was portrayed as a hastily devised response to the Sri Lankan blockade of the Indian relief flotilla, it was not so. The military Intelligence (MI) had thought of tit well in advance as a contingency. A day before the drop, the MI –which had got sucked into Sri Lankan affairs in 1986-was ready with a map of Colombo marked with offices and residences of President Jayawardena, Prime Minister Premadasa, Athulathmudali, Joint Operations Command (JOC) chief Nalin Seneviratne, Sri Lankan Police chief Ernest Perera and three service chiefs. In the case of Athulathmudalai, the MI also had the address of a Burgher woman he was known to be friendly with and whom he reportedly visited in the evenings accompanied by a lone security guard. The grandiose plan was to seize all the VIPs-including the president and prime minister-if the Indian planes were shot down by the Sri Lankans.
The MI also found out the strength of all police stations and military garrisons in and around Colombo and location of open grounds where Indian troops could be conveniently paradropped or landed to carry out the blitzkrieg. These included the St. Peters College ground, the sports ministry playground, the S.S. C. cricket ground, the C.C.C. playground, the Galle Face green, the Campbell Park, the St, Joseph’s College ground, the Zahira College ground, the St. Benedicts College ground and the Sugathadasa stadium.
To prevent any possible backlash on the Indian community, the Indian high commission asked its diplomats and staff and Indian nationals in Colombo to move into luxury hotels ahead of June 4. But fortunately, the air drop passed off peacefully. No wonder, Dixit later called the so-called mercy mission, “ operation Poomalai” (Garland), India’s ‘first military projection into Sri Lanka short of actual violence” What he did not say was that had Colombo reacted violently, it would have end up as “Operation Red garland”.
Following is a gleaning from the book titled ‘Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas” by the Indian journalist M. R. Narayan Swamy ISBN 81-220-0386-9
On June 3, that intervention took the form of a flotilla of 19 fishing boats loaded with 38 tonnes of pulses, bread, vegetables, milk, rice, salt, kerosene and match boxes which set sail for Jaffna from Rameshwaram, in Tamil nadu, flying Red Cross flags. On board were nearly 100 journalists. But the Sri Lankan navy barred the way, and the flotilla returned to Tamil Nadu after six-hour sea odyssey.
The next day, giving Colombo a bare 35-mintue notice, five Indian AN-32 transporters took off from Banglore and, with a protective ring thrown by
four Mirage fighters, air dropped 25 tonnes of relief material over Jaffna. It was Gandhi’s response to the Sri Lankan refusal to entertain the
flotillas. The Indian government made I clear that any shooting a he aircraft would be met by force. A livid Athulathmudali, his ‘Operation Liberation” now in limbo, said some of the Indian food was eaten by crows after they fell into the Jaffna lagoon.
Although the June 4 air drop was portrayed as a hastily devised response to the Sri Lankan blockade of the Indian relief flotilla, it was not so. The military Intelligence (MI) had thought of tit well in advance as a contingency. A day before the drop, the MI –which had got sucked into Sri Lankan affairs in 1986-was ready with a map of Colombo marked with offices and residences of President Jayawardena, Prime Minister Premadasa, Athulathmudali, Joint Operations Command (JOC) chief Nalin Seneviratne, Sri Lankan Police chief Ernest Perera and three service chiefs. In the case of Athulathmudalai, the MI also had the address of a Burgher woman he was known to be friendly with and whom he reportedly visited in the evenings accompanied by a lone security guard. The grandiose plan was to seize all the VIPs-including the president and prime minister-if the Indian planes were shot down by the Sri Lankans.
The MI also found out the strength of all police stations and military garrisons in and around Colombo and location of open grounds where Indian troops could be conveniently paradropped or landed to carry out the blitzkrieg. These included the St. Peters College ground, the sports ministry playground, the S.S. C. cricket ground, the C.C.C. playground, the Galle Face green, the Campbell Park, the St, Joseph’s College ground, the Zahira College ground, the St. Benedicts College ground and the Sugathadasa stadium.
To prevent any possible backlash on the Indian community, the Indian high commission asked its diplomats and staff and Indian nationals in Colombo to move into luxury hotels ahead of June 4. But fortunately, the air drop passed off peacefully. No wonder, Dixit later called the so-called mercy mission, “ operation Poomalai” (Garland), India’s ‘first military projection into Sri Lanka short of actual violence” What he did not say was that had Colombo reacted violently, it would have end up as “Operation Red garland”.
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