The planned Indian invasion of Sri Lanka in 1986
To teach Colombo “a lesson” for its pro-West foreign policy
Following is an extraction from the book titled ‘Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas” by the Indian journalist M. R. Narayan Swamy ISBN 81-220-0386-9
The Indian government had its own reasons for training the Tamils. Sources in all Tamil groups now assert that India was never serious about Ealam and gave then training and arms only to teach Colombo “a lesson” for its pro-West foreign policy. At the most New Delhi would have wanted the Tamils to secure limited autonomy. But it was widely rumored then-both in Sri Lanka and India-that Mrs. Gandhi might do a Bangladesh or Cyprus in the island’s northeast. The rumor was reinforced by what the Indian trainers told the trainees. ‘We have to finish this soon,’ Shankar Rajee quotes an Indian army officer as telling him, referring to a batch under training in Dehra Dun. ‘We need a scout force to lead us. You are not going do the real fighting. But be prepared.” Shankar added:’ The message that was given was clear-cut. The Indians were going to intervene.”
Douglas Devananada, who now lives in Colombo, said the way the Indian army officers conducted themselves, “we realized that they were only trying to use us (in their gameplan).”
S, who went on a four-month stint to Dehra Dun in October 1983, said the Indians, obviously under instructions, ‘asked us to take various photographs when we got back (to Sri Lanka). When we refused, the officers got angry. Our trainer said no training would be given in that case. So we gave in. but we said we will take the photographers only after consulting our leaders.’
Added B, another Tamil trained in India:’ The trainers asked us numerous questions about bridges, railway tracks, places to land, the depth of the sea, the coastline. They promised to teach us how to read maps and blow the up, but suddenly changed their mind. When we pressed them, they gave us quick lessons in map reading…Two of had been trained by the PLO. We knew that what the Indians were teaching us was useless stuff.”
Another Tamil said: “The Indians taught us conventional war. We learnt guerilla war ourselves, studying books and magazines and of course by sheer experience.” Other Tamils, however, claimed that guerilla war was part of the Indian curriculum.
There were other irritants too. The Indian trainers knew they were doing sensitive work, but took it as another job. Some appeared sincerely concerned about the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Some, the Tamils said, were indifferent. One trainees said: ‘When I was there, two things happened which hurt us. First they (Indians) gave us enough time to assemble and dismantle our weapons. Later they arbitrarily reduced the time and began to hurry us. The even stopped the 10 a. m. tea. I don’t know why. These might look petty, but it hurts us very much. We asked ourselves: Is this India our folks at home have been worshipping? At the end of it all we were firm that it is we who should do the fighting for Eelam, not the Indians.’
But promises of arms deliveries and some diplomatic approach by RAW officials washed away the hurt feelings of many. “They agency people,” said one militant, referring to RAW agents, ‘were very nice to us. They told us: ‘Don’t worry. We will give you all that you want. But please have patience.’”
Each group knew that the other was also being trained, but no two groups ever came face to face. From September 1983 until India and Sri Lanka signed the accord in July 1987, the RAW trained an estimated 1,200 Tamils in the use of automatic and semi-automatic weapons, and in laying mines, map reading, guerilla war, mountaineering, demolitions and anti-tank warfare. Each training capsule lasted three to four month, and rarely six month. Training was also given separately, on the lines of the army, to ‘officers” and ‘soldiers”. Select members of EROS, LTTE, EPRLF and ENDLF were also given special training in diving and under-sea sabotage. A limited number of Tamils were handpicked for intelligence gathering.
Some trainees were asked to report exclusively on the movement of ships and other activities in Trincomalee. At times, the training was intensive that the Indians actually hurried up the batches, saying: “Look, another group is coming. We have to clear you before that. So better be quick and grasp what we are telling you.’ The last of the “crash courses” was conducted in December 1986, a full month after the Tamil Nadu police cracked down on Tamil militants, seizing their arms and communication equipment. Some training still went on in the weeks preceding the May 1987 Vadamarachchi operation by the Sri Lankan military.
Arms deliveries to various groups began in 1984 and went on almost until the 1987 India-Sri Lanka agreement, punctuated by period and self-deceiving denial that India was not training Sri Lankans or desiring to break-up of the island republic. All three parties in the conflict-the Indian and the Sri Lankan governments and the Tamil militants-knew the truth.
To teach Colombo “a lesson” for its pro-West foreign policy
Following is an extraction from the book titled ‘Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas” by the Indian journalist M. R. Narayan Swamy ISBN 81-220-0386-9
The Indian government had its own reasons for training the Tamils. Sources in all Tamil groups now assert that India was never serious about Ealam and gave then training and arms only to teach Colombo “a lesson” for its pro-West foreign policy. At the most New Delhi would have wanted the Tamils to secure limited autonomy. But it was widely rumored then-both in Sri Lanka and India-that Mrs. Gandhi might do a Bangladesh or Cyprus in the island’s northeast. The rumor was reinforced by what the Indian trainers told the trainees. ‘We have to finish this soon,’ Shankar Rajee quotes an Indian army officer as telling him, referring to a batch under training in Dehra Dun. ‘We need a scout force to lead us. You are not going do the real fighting. But be prepared.” Shankar added:’ The message that was given was clear-cut. The Indians were going to intervene.”
Douglas Devananada, who now lives in Colombo, said the way the Indian army officers conducted themselves, “we realized that they were only trying to use us (in their gameplan).”
S, who went on a four-month stint to Dehra Dun in October 1983, said the Indians, obviously under instructions, ‘asked us to take various photographs when we got back (to Sri Lanka). When we refused, the officers got angry. Our trainer said no training would be given in that case. So we gave in. but we said we will take the photographers only after consulting our leaders.’
Added B, another Tamil trained in India:’ The trainers asked us numerous questions about bridges, railway tracks, places to land, the depth of the sea, the coastline. They promised to teach us how to read maps and blow the up, but suddenly changed their mind. When we pressed them, they gave us quick lessons in map reading…Two of had been trained by the PLO. We knew that what the Indians were teaching us was useless stuff.”
Another Tamil said: “The Indians taught us conventional war. We learnt guerilla war ourselves, studying books and magazines and of course by sheer experience.” Other Tamils, however, claimed that guerilla war was part of the Indian curriculum.
There were other irritants too. The Indian trainers knew they were doing sensitive work, but took it as another job. Some appeared sincerely concerned about the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Some, the Tamils said, were indifferent. One trainees said: ‘When I was there, two things happened which hurt us. First they (Indians) gave us enough time to assemble and dismantle our weapons. Later they arbitrarily reduced the time and began to hurry us. The even stopped the 10 a. m. tea. I don’t know why. These might look petty, but it hurts us very much. We asked ourselves: Is this India our folks at home have been worshipping? At the end of it all we were firm that it is we who should do the fighting for Eelam, not the Indians.’
But promises of arms deliveries and some diplomatic approach by RAW officials washed away the hurt feelings of many. “They agency people,” said one militant, referring to RAW agents, ‘were very nice to us. They told us: ‘Don’t worry. We will give you all that you want. But please have patience.’”
Each group knew that the other was also being trained, but no two groups ever came face to face. From September 1983 until India and Sri Lanka signed the accord in July 1987, the RAW trained an estimated 1,200 Tamils in the use of automatic and semi-automatic weapons, and in laying mines, map reading, guerilla war, mountaineering, demolitions and anti-tank warfare. Each training capsule lasted three to four month, and rarely six month. Training was also given separately, on the lines of the army, to ‘officers” and ‘soldiers”. Select members of EROS, LTTE, EPRLF and ENDLF were also given special training in diving and under-sea sabotage. A limited number of Tamils were handpicked for intelligence gathering.
Some trainees were asked to report exclusively on the movement of ships and other activities in Trincomalee. At times, the training was intensive that the Indians actually hurried up the batches, saying: “Look, another group is coming. We have to clear you before that. So better be quick and grasp what we are telling you.’ The last of the “crash courses” was conducted in December 1986, a full month after the Tamil Nadu police cracked down on Tamil militants, seizing their arms and communication equipment. Some training still went on in the weeks preceding the May 1987 Vadamarachchi operation by the Sri Lankan military.
Arms deliveries to various groups began in 1984 and went on almost until the 1987 India-Sri Lanka agreement, punctuated by period and self-deceiving denial that India was not training Sri Lankans or desiring to break-up of the island republic. All three parties in the conflict-the Indian and the Sri Lankan governments and the Tamil militants-knew the truth.
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